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THE EXPANDING RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN NEW YORK
I. Introduction
The right to counsel in New York has historically provided the
accused with broad protection. A series of recent New York Court of
Appeals decisions have upheld the right of a criminal suspect to have
the assistance of an attorney at every stage of legal proceedings against
him.' The court's reverence for the right to counsel is based upon the
conviction that the presence of an attorney is the most effective means
of minimizing the disadvantage at which an accused is placed when
he is confronted with the law enforcement power of the state. 2 In
order to ensure that an accused will not waive this constitutional right
out of ignorance, confusion or fear, the court has held that in certain
situations the purported waiver of the right to counsel of a person in
custody will not be given legal effect unless it is made in the presence
of an attorney. 3
1. People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978)
(once a matter is a subject of legal controversy, any discussions relating thereto
should be conducted by counsel); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E,2d
628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963) (defendant's confession obtained during interrogation
conducted before arraignment and after defendant's lawyer had requested and been
denied access to him were excluded); People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d
103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962) (voluntary statements of an unrepresented accused
made to a police officer after arrest and arraignment but before indictment were
excluded); People v. Di Biasi, 7 N,Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960)
(post-indictment interrogation in absence of counsel was a violation of the defend-
ant's constitutional rights).
The statutory bases for this protection was provided by N.Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC.
§§ 8, 188, 308, 699 (McKinney 1881 & Supp. 1959) (current versions at N.Y. CRIM.
PRoc. LAW §§ 170.10(3)-(4), (6), 210.15(2)-(3), 60.15(2) (McKinney 1971 & Supp.
1980)), which provide a criminal defendant with the right to the assistance of counsel
at every stage of the criminal action. For the parallel constitutional bases, see note 4
infra.
2. People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 207, 400 N.E.2d 360, 363, 424
N.Y.S.2d 421, 423 (1980); see also People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d at 160, 385 N.E.2d at
614, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 877, which traces "the right of a criminal defendant [in New
York] to interpose an attorney between himself and the sometimes awesome power of
the sovereign ... "
3. People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968)
(once an attorney has entered the proceeding, the police may not question the
defendant in absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver of this right in
the attorney's presence). In People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384
N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976), the court explains that the rule that "a person in custody may
validly waive the right to counsel only in the presence of a lawyer breathes life into
the requirement that a waiver of a constitutional right must be competent, intelligent
and voluntary." Id. at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
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What began as an attempt to balance the protections of the accused
with the state's interest in law enforcement has emerged as a rule
weighing heavily in favor of the defendant. 4  The New York ap-
4. Both the Federal and New York State Constitutions provide an accused with
protection against self-incrimination and the the right to counsel. The fifth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .. " U.S. CoNsT.
amend. V. The self-incrimination clause is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). The sixth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment is applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-42
(1963). The New York State Constitution provides that "[i]n any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with
counsel as in civil actions. . . nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. ... N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
The right to counsel under the New York State Constitution has been interpreted
more expansively by the New York Court of Appeals than it has by the Supreme
Court under the fifth and sixth amendments of the United States Constitution. New
York currently extends greater protections to criminal defendants during the pre-trial
period than is presently required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fifth
and sixth amendments of the United States Constitution. Galie, State Constitutional
Guarantees and Protection of Defendants' Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978,
28 BUFFALo L. REV. 157, 178 (1979). Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), were not revolutionary in New York since
the protections afforded to criminal suspects by Donovan had already surpassed the
protections afforded by Escobedo and Miranda. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at
483-84, 348 N.E.2d at 897-98, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422. Miranda excludes a confession
unless it can be shown that the authorities secured the accused's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination through the use of procedural safeguards.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444. New York's exclusionary rule is broader since it
excludes those confessions obtained in absence of counsel after indictment or arraign-
ment or those obtained after counsel had entered the proceeding but before indict-
ment or arraignment. See note 1 supra.
Recent New York decisions have continued to buttress the criminal defendant's
right to counsel while Supreme Court decisions after Miranda have placed limitations
on defendants' rights. See Edwards v. Arizona, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981) (once an
accused invokes his right to counsel, he can be subjected to further interrogation if he
himself initiates it); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (the police may renew
questioning of a suspect who has exercised his right to remain silent when the
renewed questioning is about another unrelated crime); United States v. Ash, 413
U.S. 300 (1973) (the right to counsel does not attach at a post-indictment photo-
graphic line-up); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (the right to counsel does not
attach until indictment or when formal charges are brought against a criminal
defendant); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (even though a criminal
defendant has neither received nor effectively waived counsel, his statements made in
custody may be used to impeach his credibility at trial).
By restricting the scope of its decisions to state constitutional and statutory provi-
sions, the New York Court of Appeals has isolated itself from federal court review.
The Supreme Court's "adequate state grounds" doctrine provides that if there is an
adequate and independent ground for a state court decision, then even when the
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proach is considered by some to be problematic-imposing onerous
burdens on police departments which impede effective law enforce-
ment.5 The most recent decisions of the New York Court of Appeals
sacrifice the effective operation of the criminal justice system by re-
stricting the ability of the police to obtain confessions from criminal
suspects in the absence of counsel.6 As a result, police efforts to
control crime will be hindered, particularly in urban centers where
rising levels of crime7 are reflected by large numbers of arrests and a
high rate of recidivism.8 This Note discusses the criminal defendant's
pre-trial right to counsel in New York. Section II outlines the histori-
cal development of this fundamental right. Judicial expansions of the
pre-trial right to counsel, including the People v. Bartolomeo deci-
sion, are analyzed in Section III with a view toward their effect on
law enforcement. These decisions are divided into three areas of legal
inquiry: interrogation regarding unrelated matters, formal com-
mencement of a criminal action, and prior arrest. The Note concludes
that the New York Court of Appeals has sacrificed effective law
enforcement in its attempt to protect the defendant's constitutional
rights by expanding the pre-trial right to counsel.
II. Historical Development of the Right to Counsel
The right to counsel during custodial interrogation is a guiding
principle of New York law and policy. This principle has found
expression in two distinct, but parallel, lines of cases which hold that
the right to counsel attaches "indelibly" so that the right may not be
waived outside the presence of the defendant's attorney. 0
state court has also decided a federal question, the Supreme Court will not review the
decision. Murdoch v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
5. The Uncounselled Confession: A New York Variant, 14 COLUM. J. OF L. AND
Soc. PROB. 343, 344 (1979). Contra, Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and
Protection of Defendants' Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFFALO L.
REV. 157 (1979).
6. By further increasing the situations in which the right to counsel attaches and
by further limiting the conditions for waiver of the right, the court has severely
restricted the ability of the police to obtain confessions from criminal suspects.
7. See note 104 infra.
8. See note 105 infra.
9. See People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d at 165, 385 N.E.2d at 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d at
881. The court uses the word "indelibly" to describe the point at which the right to
counsel has attached to the extent that it can only be waived in the presence of a
lawyer.
10. The evolution of the right to counsel in New York has been traced in a number
of opinions. See, e.g., Peoples v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422
N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979); People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d
874 (1978); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419
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A. The Di Biasi Cases
Beginning with People v. Di Biasi," the court of appeals held that
the right to counsel arises upon the commencement of formal adver-
sary proceedings.' 2 In reversing the conviction of a defendant who
had made incriminating admissions when interrogated without an
attorney present,' 3 the Di Biasi court ruled that post-indictment custo-
dial interrogation conducted in the absence of counsel was unconstitu-
tional and any statements thus obtained were inadmissible.' 4 The
Di Biasi holding was extended in People v. Meyer,' 5 where the court
of appeals reasoned that arraignment, and not indictment, must be
deemed the first stage of a criminal proceeding. Therefore, a post-
arraignment statement was held to be within the constitutional pro-
tection of the right to counsel.'" Most recently, the court of appeals in
People v. Samuels, ' 7 held that the filing of a felony complaint triggers
the commencement of proceedings within the Di'Biasi rule.'
8
(1976); People v. Miller, 76 A.D.2d 576, 430 N.Y.S.2d 865 (2d Dep't 1980). See also
The Uncounselled Confession: A New York Variant, 14 COLUM. J. OF L. AND SOC.
PROB. 343 (1979); Note, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 401 (1977); The Survey of New York
Practice, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 201 (1976).
11. 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
12. The controversy which arose in these cases was: at what point does a formal
proceeding commence triggering the attachment of the suspect's right to counsel.
13. 7 N.Y.2d at 550-51, 166 N.E.2d at 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
14. Id. at 550-51, 166 N.E.2d at 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 25. b~i Biasilis the progeni-
tor of New York's right to counsel doctrine. The defendant surrendered to the police
on his attorney's advice six years after being indicted. The defendant made several
incriminating admissions while being interrogated in the absence of his attorney. In
reversing his conviction, the court of appeals held that the defendant's constitutional
rights were violated by the post-indictment custodial interrogation conducted in
absence of counsel and that the statements thus obtained were inadmissible. Id. The
"post-indictment rule" adopted in Di Biasi was affirmed in People v. Waterman, 9
N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
15. 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962). The court held that
any statement made by an accused after arraignment but before indictment, without
the presence of counsel, is inadmissible.
16. Id. at 164-65, 182 N.E.2d at 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
17. 49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1980).
18. Samuels held that the filing of a felony complaint also commences formal
criminal proceedings. This expansion of the Di Biasi and Meyer rules which held
respectively that the right attaches upon indictment and arraignment renders this
line of cases consistent with present statutory law.
By statute, a criminal action now commences with the filing of an accusatory
instrument, N.Y. CUM. PROC. LAW § 1.20(17) (McKinney 1971), which includes a
felony complaint, N.Y. CpM. PRoc. LAW §§ 1.20(1), (8) (McKinney 1971 & Supp.
1980-81).
The decision in Samuels that once an accusatory instrument is filed the defendant
cannot waive his right to counsel in his lawyer's absence, applies with limited
retroactive effect to cases that were already on direct review at the time Samuels was
decided. People v. Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d 213 (1981).
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Once adversary proceedings have commenced and the right to
counsel has attached, a defendant cannot make an effective waiver of
his right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel unless
his attorney is present at the time of the waiver. According to the cases
which follow Di Biasi, this protection exists even though the suspect
has neither requested nor retained counsel.' 9
B. The Donovan-Arthur Cases
A second line of cases, which resulted in the Donovan-Arthur rule,
extends a suspect's "indelible" right to counsel where formal proceed-
ings have not yet commenced, but where a suspect has retained or
been assigned counsel to represent him. 20 Under these decisions, once
an attorney has become involved in an action, the police may not
question the defendant or attempt to secure a waiver of counsel
without his attorney being present.2 '
The Donovan-Arthur the cases protect the defendant's right to
counsel and right against self-incrimination from the time an attorney
enters the proceeding. They afford an even greater degree of protec-
tion to criminal defendants than the Di Biasi cases. For example, the
Donovan-Arthur rule requires that an attorney be present at a prelim-
inary interrogation where counsel has already become involved,
whereas under the Di Biasi rule, the right to counsel does not attach
until formal adversary proceedings have commenced.
In People v. Donovan,2 2 the defendant was interrogated by the
police before he had been arraigned or indicted 23 and his written
confession was obtained after an attorney's request to see him was
denied. 24 The court excluded the confession, holding that New York's
constitutional and statutory provisions which guarantee the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and due process re-
quired the exclusion of a confession obtained from a suspect in custody
19. People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
20. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976);
People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968); People
v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
21. People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968).
Later cases precluded the necessity for the attorney to physically appear at the
interrogation site so that currently a telephone call is sufficient for an attorney to
"enter the proceeding" and invoke the suspect's right to counsel. See People v.
Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965). The defendant's
request for counsel may also invoke his indelible right to counsel. People v. Cun-
ningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980).
22. 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
23. Id. at 152, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
24. Id. at 150-51, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
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after his attorney had requested and been denied access to him. 25 As
a result, it extended the rules prohibiting uncounseled interrogation
once criminal proceedings had commenced, to a situation where the
defendant was in custody but not indicted or arraigned.
In People v. Arthur,26 the defendant was charged with attempted
murder. He signed a confession after his attorney, who was not for-
mally retained on the attempted murder charge but who had repre-
sented the defendant on other matters, was prevented from conferring
with him by police until after they had finished interrogating him. 27
The court of appeals held that police may not question a defendant in
the absence of counsel once an attorney has entered the proceeding
unless there is an affirmative waiver of the right to counsel made in
the attorney's presence. 28  Furthermore, the court held this to be an
automatic right that need not be requested by either the suspect or the
attorney.29 Therefore, police are obligated to notify a suspect's attor-
ney and wait for his arrival before interrogating him.
The Donovan-Arthur rule that once an attorney becomes involved
in an action the police may not question the defendant or attempt to
secure a waiver of counsel except in his attorney's presence was af-
firmed by the court of appeals in People v. Hobson.30  The court
25. Id. at 151, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 843. In People v. Failla, 14
N.Y.2d 178, 199 N.E.2d 366, 250 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1964), decided after Donovan, the
defendant had made part of his confession when his attorney arrived and was denied
access to the defendant. The court held that Donovan mandated that the entire
confession was inadmissible.
26. 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968).
27. Id. at 327, 239 N.E.2d at 538, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65.
In Arthur, the attorney learned of the defendant's arrest while watching the news
on television. Having been the defendant's attorney on other matters, he went to the
police department and requested to see the defendant. He was told to wait until
police had completed their questioning of the defendant, but during this time defend-
ant had signed a confession. The attorney then met with the defendant and, after
instructing police not to question him further, departed. The defendant was again
questioned the next day in absence of counsel and made several incriminating state-
ments. Id.
28. Id. at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. The court held that the
signed confession and the oral statements were inadmissible. Id. at 330, 239 N.E.2d
at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666-67.
29. Id. at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. The court also stated that
according to the principles derived from Donovan, Failla and Gunner, it was not
significant that the defendant's attorney was not formally retained. Once the police
know or have been apprised of the fact that the defendant is represented by counsel
or that an attorney has communicated with the police for the purpose of representing
the defendant, the accused's right to counsel attaches, and this right is not dependent
upon the existence of a formal retainer. Id.
30. 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976). Defendant Hobson,
while being held in a county jail on unrelated charges, was placed in a lineup for a
[Vol. X356
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noted that the Donovan and Arthur cases had extended constitutional
protections of a defendant under the state constitution beyond those
afforded by the federal constitution .3  Recognizing that the Miranda
pre-interrogation warnings 32 administered by police officers to a sus-
pect might be sufficient to protect his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, the court declared that the presence of counsel is a more effective
safeguard against an involuntary waiver of counsel 33 than a mere
warning in the absence of counsel.3 4
In Hobson, defendant's confession, made after he signed a waiver
of his right to counsel in the absence of his attorney, was found to
have been improperly admitted at trial. The court of appeals held that
once counsel has been engaged in a criminal proceeding, a defendant
robbery. A lawyer who had been appointed for Hobson prior to his placement in the
lineup left after Hobson was positively identified. The defendant then signed a
waiver and agreed to speak to detectives about the robbery. Although the detective
knew Hobson was represented by counsel, he made no effort to inform the attorney
that he intended to interrogate his client. Hobson said he understood the preinterro-
gation warnings which were read to him, waived his right to counsel, and confessed
to the robbery. Id. at 482-83, 348 N.E.2d at 896-97, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 420-21.
31. Id. at 483-84, 384 N.E.2d at 897-98, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422. In contrast to New
York's per se exclusionary rule for confessions obtained in absence of counsel after
indictment or arraignment, or confessions obtained after counsel had entered the
proceedings but before indictment or arraignment, Miranda excludes a confession
unless it can be shown that the authorities secured the accused's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination through the use of procedural safeguards.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444.
32. In Miranda, the Court held that when an individual is taken into custody and
interrogated, his privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. 384 U.S. at
457-58. To protect the privilege, the following procedural safeguards must be em-
ployed to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored: The
person must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise
these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warn-
ings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may know-
ingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a
statement. Id. at 444.
33. An effective waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing, intelligent and
voluntary. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938).
34. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
The court stressed that the defendant's real protection against an abuse of power by
the authorities is the advice of his lawyer at every critical stage of the proceedings
against him. The right to counsel is more effective than preinterrogation warnings
since the warnings often provide "only a feeble opportunity to obtain a lawyer,
because the suspect or accused is required to determine his need, unadvised by
anyone who has his interests at heart." Id. at 485, 348 N.E.2d at 899, 384 N.Y.S.2d
at 423.
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may not waive his right to counsel when his lawyer is not present. 35
The court of appeals stressed the importance of giving a criminal
defendant undeniable access to counsel during interrogation to ensure
that any waiver of his constitutional rights would be knowing and
intelligent. 36 Hobson was significant because it overruled three cases
which had challenged the Arthur requirement that an effective
waiver of counsel had to be made in the presence of an attorney. 37 In
reaffirming Arthur and its underlying principles, the majority opinion
noted that the rationale used in Arthur was based on New York State's
constitutional and statutory guarantees of the privilege against self-in-
crimination, the right to counsel, and due process. 38 The court stated
that, as with all attempts to apply constitutional principles, the Ar-
thur case is not absolute, and the fact that a defendant is represented
by counsel on a proceeding unrelated to the charges under investiga-
tion is not sufficient to invoke the rule. Emphasizing the importance
of applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the court noted that those
35. Id. at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
36. Id.
37. People v. Wooden, 31 N.Y.2d 753, 290 N.E.2d 436, 338 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 987 (1973); People v. Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628,
319 N.Y.S.2d 825, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971); People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d
155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971).
These cases departed radically from the rule established by the court of appeals in
Arthur. The Robles court characterized the Arthur principles as "merely a theoretical
statement of the rule. This dogmatic claim is not the New York Law." People v.
Robles, 27 N.Y.2d at 158, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 795. In People v.
Lopez, the court ignored Arthur and declared that the right to counsel and the right
to remain silent may be validly waived after the defendant has been indicted. 28
N.Y.2d at 26, 268 N.E.2d at 629, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 827. A federal court later reversed
this conviction. United States ex rel. Lopez v. Zelker, 344 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd without opinion, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972).
People v. Wooden affirmed the conviction of the defendant based upon incriminat-
ing statements made in the absence of counsel after indictment. People v. Wooden,
31 N.Y.2d 753, 290 N.E.2d 436, 338 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1972). Wooden, Lopez, and
Robles created a period of uncertainty as to the scope of the right to counsel under the
New York State Constitution. For a discussion of the court of appeal's attempts to
limit the Donovan-Arthur rule, see generally Survey of New York Practice, 51 S'r.
JOHN's L. REv. 201, 216-18 (1976).
Hobson overruled Robles, Lopez and Wooden but let stand several other cases that
had placed limitations on the Donovan-Arthur rule. See People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d
327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971) (the Donovan-Arthur rule applies only
after police learn that an attorney has entered the proceedings to assist the accused in
defending against the specific charges for which he is being held); People v. Kaye, 25
N.Y.2d 139, 250 N.E.2d 329, 303 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1969) (unsolicited spontaneous utter-
ances made in counsel's absence were admissible); People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19,
250 N.E.2d 36, 302 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1969) (the right to counsel does not attach during
non-custodial interrogation).
38. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at 483, 348 N.E.2d at 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
[Vol. X
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who must enforce the prevailing law should be able to rely on its
stability. 39  In Hobson, the court of appeals attempted to delineate
the situations in which custodial interrogation was prohibited,
thereby giving police clear guidelines to follow. The court reasoned
that after an attorney enters a proceeding to defend the suspect
against the specific charges on which he is being held, uncounseled
interrogation should be prohibited.40
III. The Recent Expansion of the Right to Counsel
As the rule evolved in New York, the indelible right to counsel
attached only if the defendant's attorney had been secured to assist the
accused in defending against the specific charges for which he was
held. 4 1  For instance, in People v. Taylor,42 the defendants, repre-
sented by an attorney on a robbery charge, made incriminating state-
ments about a murder in the absence of counsel. The court held that
these statements were admissible because the attorney's involvement
related to a separate charge of robbery. 43 Therefore, for a period of
time, a defendant in custody who was represented by counsel on one
charge could still be interrogated in the absence of counsel about other
unrelated charges. 44 This gave the police a means of circumventing
39. Id. at 489, 348 N.E.2d at 901, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 425-26. The court also noted
two other exceptions to the rule. The rule does not render inadmissible a defendant's
spontaneously uttered statement, nor does it apply to non-custodial interrogation. Id.
at 483, 348 N.E.2d at 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422. Contra, People v. Skinner, 52
N.Y.2d 24, 417 N.E.2d 501, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1980); see notes 58-60 infra and
accompanying text.
40. 39 N.Y.2d at 481, 348 N.E.2d at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
41. This rule was first enunciated in People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d at 332, 266
N.E.2d at 633, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 5, and restated in People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at
484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422. See also People v. Hetherington, 27
N.Y.2d 242, 265 N.E.2d 530, 317 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1970).
A similar exception exists in the Di Biasi line of cases, so that a defendant who has
been arraigned or indicted on one charge can still be questioned as to unrelated
crimes in the absence of counsel. People v. Stanley, 15 N.Y.2d 30, 203 N.E.2d 475,
255 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1964), cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 802 (1965). However, a lower
court has interpreted People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422
N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979), to have overruled Stanley. See People v. Miller, 76 A.D.2d 576,
430 N.Y.S.2d 865 (2d Dep't 1980), discussed in note 66 infra and accompanying text.
42. 27 N.Y.2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971).
43. Id. at 332, 266 N.E.2d at 633, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 5. The court established the
rule that the prohibition against interrogating a suspect who is represented by
counsel does not apply unless the attorney has been secured to assist the accused in
defending against the specific charges for which he is held. Id.
44. See People v. Miller, 76 A.D.2d 576, 581, 430 N.Y.S.2d 865, 869 (2d Dep't
1980).
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the rule that interrogation must cease once an attorney has entered the
proceedings: police could legally continue to interrogate a suspect
about unrelated matters after an attorney became involved in the
pending charge in the hope of eliciting a confession to the crime for
which the attorney was retained. This exception which permitted
interrogation about unrelated charges was gradually narrowed be-
cause the court found it difficult to apply the exception consistently
with the underlying principles of Hobson.45
A. Interrogation Regarding Unrelated Matters
In the landmark decision of People v. Rogers, 46 the court of appeals
changed the existing law in the area of custodial interrogation. Repu-
diating the rule allowing interrogation of a defendant about unrelated
matters, the court held that once a suspect's right to counsel has
attached, all police questioning must cease. The court stated that
"once a defendant is represented by an attorney, the police may not
elicit from him any statements, except those necessary for processing
or his physical needs. Nor may they seek a waiver of this right, except
in the presence of counsel." 47
In Rogers, the defendant was arrested for robbery. 48 The interro-
gation at issue occurred after police were instructed by the defendant's
attorney to cease further questioning. The police continued to ques-
tion the defendant after obtaining a purported waiver about activities
unrelated to the robbery charge. After questioning ceased, the defend-
ant made incriminating statements relating to the robbery. 49 The
45. In People v. Ramos, 40 N.Y.2d 610, 357 N.E.2d 955, 389 N.Y.S.2d 299
(1976), defendant was represented by an attorney on a drug charge. The attorney
advised defendant not to make any statements about unrelated robbery and murder
charges. This advice was deemed sufficient to trigger the Arthur rule and the state-
ments about the robbery and murder charges were suppressed. Id. at 618, 357
N.E.2d at 961, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 304. In People v. Carl, 46 N.Y.2d 806, 386 N.E.2d
828, 413 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1978), defendant was questioned about a crime different
than the one for which he was in custody. Notwithstanding the fact that separate
crimes were involved, the court determined that the charges were sufficiently related
to preclude interrogation in the absence of counsel. In People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d
863, 392 N.E.2d 1248, 419 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1979), defendant was questioned in the
absence of counsel about an assault and a homicide committed seven months apart.
Although conceding that questioning about the homicide alone would have been
permissible, the court suppressed statements concerning the homicide stating that
police exploited concededly impermissible questioning about the assault for the pur-
pose of obtaining statements relating to the homicide. Id. at 865, 392 N.E.2d at 1249,
419 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
46. 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979).
47. Id. at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
48. Id. at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
49. Id. In Rogers, defendant was arrested on suspicion of robbery, and Miranda
warnings were administered. Id. Defendant told the police that although he had an
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court held that any inculpatory statements made by the defendant in
custody after he was questioned by police officers about unrelated
activities were inadmissible.5 0  The underlying reason for the court's
holding was its belief that an attorney's presence serves to maintain a
balance between the rights of the suspect and the interests of the
state. s1 The court declared that the fundamental right to counsel
guaranteed by the New York State Constitution is more important
than the state's interest in investigating and prosecuting criminal con-
duct: "We may not blithely override the importance of the attorney's
entry by permitting interrogation of an accused with respect to mat-
ters which some may perceive to be unrelated."5 2
The practical effect of the Rogers decision on law enforcement is
illustrated by the dissenting opinion in that case. Judge Jasen noted:
pursuant to the majority's position, law enforcement officers will
be precluded from questioning a defendant charged with driving a
motor vehicle while intoxicated about a brutal murder unless they
first contact the defendant's attorney representing him on the driv-
ing while intoxicated charge and secure his presence at the ques-
tioning. This is so even if the defendant was an innocent bystander
who witnessed the murder and voluntarily agreed to co-operate
with the police. Surely, the right to counsel was never intended to
prevent a defendant from voluntarily co-operating with the police
concerning matters unrelated to the crime for which he is charged.
To hold to the contrary defies both constitutional principles and
common sense.
5 3
Since interrogation is a valuable source of information for police and
an important part of police investigation5 4 this decision is a major
impediment to law enforcement.
attorney, he was willing to speak to police in the absence of counsel. Id. After two
hours of interrogation during which defendant denied complicity in the crime, the
police received word from defendant's attorney instructing them to cease further
questioning. Id. Under a purported waiver, police thereafter continued to question
defendant for an additional four hours about unrelated activities. Id. After question-
ing ceased and the police were processing paperwork, the defendant uttered an
inculpatory statement which was overheard by one of the officers. Id.
50. Id. at 174, 397 N.E.2d at 714, 422 N.Y.S:2d at 23.
51. The court stated: "The presence of counsel confers no undue advantage to the
accused. Rather, the attorney's presence serves to equalize the positions of the ac-
cused and the sovereign, mitigating the coercive influence of the State and rendering
it less overwhelming." Id. at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
52. Id. at 169, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
53. Id. at 176-77, 397 N.E.2d at 715, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 24 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
54. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966). "Those charged with the
enforcement of the criminal law have for centuries heavily depended upon the
statements of the guilty in their quest to'identify and detain criminals." People v.
Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 34-35, 417 N.E.2d 501, 506, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207, 212 (1980)
(Jasen, J., dissenting).
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The right to counsel in the pre-trial stages has since been extended
to apply to a defendant in custody, not yet represented by counsel,
from the time he requests legal representation. In the case of People v.
Cunningham,55 for example, the accused's right to counsel was held to
include the right to have the benefit of the advice of counsel before
making the decision to waive either the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation or the right to the assistance of counsel. 5  Therefore,' once a
suspect in custody invokes his right to counsel by asking for an attor-
ney, a subsequent waiver of rights in the absence of counsel cannot be
given legal effect.57
The right to counsel has recently been expanded to protect a suspect
not in custody. In People v. Skinner,58 the defendant sought to sup-
press incriminating statements made to police officers after he volun-
tarily agreed to talk to them when the officers came to his home to
serve him with an order to show cause.59 Upholding the suppression
of the statements, the court held that where a "defendant is known to
have invoked the right to and obtained the services of counsel on the
matter about which the person is questioned, the state may not use
statements elicited from that person in the absence of a waiver of
counsel made in the presence of the attorney." 60  As a result of this
55. 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980).
56. Id. at 210, 400 N.E.2d at 364-65, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 425. The court explained
that when an unrepresented individual held in custody invokes his right to counsel,
he is, in effect, expressing his view that he is not competent to deal effectively with
the state without legal advice. Such an individual has no less need for the protections
afforded by counsel than does an individual who has previously secured the services
of an attorney. To hold that an uncounselled waiver of a represented suspect is
ineffective while the waiver of a suspect who, although not represented, had re-
quested the services of an attorney, is an informed and voluntary decision, would
make little sense. Such a rule would be unfair to those suspects who either are not
affluent enough to have had regular dealings with an attorney or have not had
previous occasions to enjoy the services of appointed counsel in an unrelated criminal
matter. Id. at 209-10, 400 N.E.2d at 364-65, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
57. Id. at 210, 400 N.E.2d at 364-65, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 425. The court has inter-
preted broadly the entry of an attorney into a proceeding signaling the attachment of
the defendant's right to counsel. For example, the defendant's "indelible" right to
counsel has been held to attach if a defendant consults with an attorney to seek his
assistance for the limited purpose of arranging for his surrender. People v. Marrero,
51 N.Y.2d 56, 409 N.E.2d 980, 431 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1980). The court also held that
although the legal representation was terminated by agreement before the defendant
was questioned, the defendant's waiver was deemed ineffective and his murder
confession was held to have been improperly admitted at trial. Id. at 59, 409 N.E.2d
at 981, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
58. 52 N.Y.2d 24, 417 N.E.2d 501, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1980); see note 39 supra.
59. Id. at 27-28, 417 N.E.2d at 502, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
60. Id. at 32, 417 N.E.2d at 505, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 211. Relying on two prior
decisions, the court held that whether or not a person is in custody at the time of
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decision, one who is suspected of a crime may insure that any state-
ments he makes to the police aware of his representation will not be
used against him. Under these circumstances, a suspect who is not in
custody and has not been arraigned, indicted or even formally accused
may not be questioned in absence of counsel.
B. Formal Commencement of a Criminal Action
The Donovan-Arthur and Di Biasi cases have converged. 61 The
filing of an accusatory instrument which constitutes the commence-
ment of a formal judicial action against the defendant is now equated
with the entry of an attorney into the proceeding.6 2 Therefore, once
a felony complaint has been filed, a defendant, who is not then
represented by an attorney, may not in the absence of counsel waive
his right to counsel.6 3  Consequently, any uncounseled admissions
will be inadmissible at trial.
In Rogers,6 4 the appearance of an attorney in an action was held to
prevent police interrogation about unrelated, as well as related, mat-
ters. Therefore, it would seem that once an action is commenced
against a defendant, no uncounseled interrogation may be conducted
interrogation is not controlling when an attorney represents that person on the
matter about which he is questioned. In People v. Townes, 41 N.Y.2d 97, 359
N.E.2d 402, 390 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1976), the court ordered statements suppressed
without reference to the custodial settings. In People v. Roberson, 41 N.Y.2d 106,
359 N.E.2d 408, 390 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1976), the court also treated the fact of custody as
irrelevant. The Skinner court also noted that People v. McKie, which held that
unsolicited spontaneous utterances made in counsel's absence were admissible, does
not compel a different result and declared that the broad statements concerning a
requirement that an individual be in custody before the non-waiver rule becomes
operative have since been discredited by Townes and Roberson. 52 N.Y.2d at 31, 417
N.E.2d at 504, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
61. People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d at 159, 385 N.E.2d at 613-14, 412 N.Y.S.2d at
876.
62. Settles held that the filing of an indictment is equated with the entry of an
attorney into the proceeding. Hence, a defendant in a post-indictment, prearraign-
ment custodial setting, even though not represented by an attorney, may not in
absence of counsel waive his right to have counsel appear at a corporeal identifica-
tion. Id. at 159, 385 N.E.2d at 614, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 876. People v. Samuels, 49
N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1980), has refined this holding to
render it consistent with N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW §§ 1.20(1), (8), (17) (McKinney 1971
& Supp. 1980). For a discussion of when formal proceedings are held to commence,
see note 18 supra. See also People v. Miller, 76 A.D.2d at 584, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
63. See People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d at 159, 385 N.E.2d at 613, 412 N.Y.S.2d at
876. Contra, People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322, 420 N.E.2d 45, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247
(1981), see notes 70-73 infra and accompanying text.
64. 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979).
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even if an attorney has not yet appeared. 65 Similarly, the prohibition
against the police obtaining a waiver of the defendant's right to
remain silent and right to counsel should apply in a situation where
formal proceedings have commenced even though no attorney has
appeared.6 6 In People v. Kazmarick,67 however, the court of appeals
did not take this approach. The court held that a pending, unrelated
criminal case upon which an arrest warrant has been issued does not
bar the police from questioning a suspect on a new matter when the
suspect is not, in fact, represented by counsel on the unrelated
charge.6 8 Departing from its prior holding which equated the com-
mencement of a criminal action with the entry of an attorney into the
proceeding,69 the court in Kazmarick stated that the right to counsel
and actual representation are not the same thing.70 The majority
opinion treated the Di Biasi and Donovan-Arthur cases as two distinct
rules and applied the Rogers prohibition against interrogation about
unrelated charges only to the Donovan-Arthur situation where the
defendant actually has an attorney.7 ' Therefore, the issue of whether
the right to counsel attaches upon the filing of an accusatory instru-
ment, as it does upon the entry of an attorney into the proceeding,
awaits clarification.
65. People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d at 331, 420 N.E.2d at 50, 438 N.Y.S.2d at
252 (Cooke, J., dissenting); People v. Miller, 76 A.D.2d at 584-85, 430 N.Y.S.2d at
871-72.
66. People v. Miller, 76 A.D.2d at 584-85, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 871-72, quoting People
v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 21. Using this
reasoning, the second department questioned People v. Stanley, 15 N.Y.2d 30, 203
N.E.2d 475, 255 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1964), cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 802 (1965), which had
authorized custodial interrogation on matters unrelated to a pending criminal action.
The exception allowing interrogation concerning unrelated matters was reaffirmed
in People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d at 329-30, 266 N.E.2d at 631, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
Rogers, overruling the Taylor exception, held that once a defendant is represented by
counsel he may not be questioned about any matters, related or unrelated. The court
seemingly left standing the rule that a defendant who has been arraigned or indicted
may be questioned about unrelated matters. But the second department in People v.
Miller, 76 A.D.2d at 585, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 872, interprets Rogers and Settles as
overruling Stanley as well as Taylor. Contra, People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322,
420 N.E.2d 45, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1981).
67. 52 N.Y.2d 322, 420 N.E.2d 45, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1981).
68. Id. at 322-23, 420 N.E.2d at 46, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
69. People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d'814 (1978).
See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
70. People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d at 328, 420 N.E.2d at 48, 438 N.Y.S.2d at
250. The court stated "[t]he fact that defendant Kazmarick may have been entitled to
counsel on the shoplifting charge [upon which formal action had been commenced]
does not require, automatically and in all events, acting as though he was in fact
represented by counsel and, therefore, protected even as to an unrelated charge." Id.
71. Id. at 327-28, 420 N.E.2d at 48, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
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C. Prior Arrest
In accord with the Donovan-Arthur rule, the court of appeals in
People v. Bartolomeo72 extended the non-waivable pre-trial right to
counsel to the initial investigatory stages of the law enforcement
process. Under Bartolomeo, legal representation on a charge for
which a suspect is arrested and released precludes the uncounseled
interrogation of the suspect in subsequent investigations of unrelated
crimes. This decision represents the broadest interpretation of the
pre-trial right to counsel in the progression of New York case law in
this area.
The defendant was arrested for arson and represented by counsel
during arraignment.7 3 He was released7 4 and nine days later appre-
hended by officers of the same law enforcement agency in connection
with an unrelated murder investigation. 75 The homicide detectives
knew of the defendant's recent arrest,7 6 but did not know whether or
to what extent he was represented by counsel. 77 In response to ques-
tions from the detectives and without mention of the fact that he
already had an attorney on the arson charge, the defendant purport-
edly waived his right to counsel and made several incriminating state-
ments. 78 The interrogation stopped when an attorney, who had been
contacted by the lawyer involved in the arson charge, called the
station and informed the police he was representing the defendant
and wanted the interrogation to cease. 0
72. 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981).
73. Id. at 230, 423 N.E.2d at 374, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
74. The reasons for defendant's release do not appear in the record.
75. Id.
76. Id. The defendant was convicted after a jury trial of felony murder in connec-
tion with a burglary in which defendant fired several shots, one of which fatally
wounded an occupant of the house. A canvass of the neighborhood disclosed that the
defendant's vehicle had been sighted at the time of the crime. A police alert was
issued which later resulted in a sighting of the vehicle near the defendant's apart-
ment. While the investigation continued, defendant and an accomplice were arrested
and released in connection with another burglary involving arson. Thus, at the time
defendant was brought into custody for questioning on the felony murder charge, the
police knew that defendant had been arrested and released approximately nine days
before. Id. at 236-37, 423 N.E.2d at 377, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 900-01 (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting).
77. Neither the defendant nor his father, who accompanied his son to the police
station, ever mentioned the fact that defendant had a lawyer. Id. at 230, 423 N.E.2d
at 374, 40 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
78. Id. The defendant was properly advised of his constitutional pre-interrogation
rights before he was questioned and when informed that he was under arrest for the
murder, agreed to talk to the officers. The interrogating detective related to defend-
ant the details of a statement given by an accomplice which implicated the defend-
ant. The defendant then made the inculpating statement which he later sought to
suppress. Id.
79. Id. at 231, 423 N.E.2d at 374, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
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The defendant contended that his incriminating statements should
have been suppressed because the waiver was legally ineffective. 0 A
4-3 majority reversed his murder conviction and ruled that the incrim-
inating statements had been obtained in violation of his right to
counsel.8 1 Specifically, the court held that interrogation is precluded
where an officer knows that the suspect has been arrested by the same
kw enforcement agency nine days previously on an unrelated charge,
if in fact, the suspect is represented by an attorney on that unrelated
charge.8 2 Such representation prevents interrogation even though the
fact of representation on the prior charge is unknown to the officer.
The knowledge of a prior arrest renders ineffective any purported
waiver of the right to counsel on a subsequent charge in the absence of
legal representation. 3 Therefore, the presence of counsel in an unre-
lated proceeding virtually immunizes a defendant from interrogation
regarding a crime subsequently committed.
The implications of the court's holding on the operation of the
criminal justice system result in a rule benefitting the repeat offender
and restricting effective law enforcement. First, the court equates
knowledge of a suspect's arrest with knowledge of representation.
Second, the decision provides greater protection to a recidivist than to
a one-time offender. Third, the court of appeals interpreted the New
York State Constitution to provide more protection to criminal de-
fendants than was previously deemed necessary.
In holding that the knowledge on the part of the police officers that
the suspect has been previously arrested precludes uncounseled inter-
rogation, if in fact the defendant was represented on the prior charge,
the court equated knowledge of an arrest with knowledge of represen-
tation. The court reasoned that "[t]his [knowledge of representation]
follows naturally on the awareness on the part of law enforcement
personnel of judicial concern for, and protection of, a criminal de-
fendant's right to the aid of counsel at every critical stage of proceed-
ings against him." '8 4 Actual knowledge of the existing arson charge
80. Id.
81. Id. The court cited People v. Miller, 54 N.Y.2d 616, 425 N.E.2d 879, 442
N.Y.S.2d 491 (1980), and People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422
N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979), as support for this conclusion.
82. 53 N.Y.2d at 231, 423 N.E.2d at 374, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897. The court stated:
"Knowledge that one in custody is represented by counsel, albeit on a separate,
unrelated charge, precludes interrogation in the absence of counsel and renders
ineffective any purported waiver of the assistance of counsel when such waiver
occurs out of the presence of the attorney." Id. (citations omitted).
83. Id.
84. Id. The dissent argued that although the defendant may have reached the
critical stage in the arson charge, where despite his consent to uncounseled interroga-
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against the defendant created an obligation in the interrogating offi-
cers to make affirmative inquiries as to whether he was represented by
an attorney on the arson charge.8 5 Although no inquiry was made,
knowledge of the defendant's legal representation was imputed to the
police81 and the court found that it was improper to question him or
accept his waiver of the right to counsel in the absence of an attor-
ney. 87
The majority in Bartolomeo extended the Rogers rule 8 against
questioning a defendant in custody about unrelated matters to prevent
tion, the indelible right to counsel nonetheless applies as a matter of law, it does not
follow that because defendant has a right to counsel in the critical stages of one
proceeding that an equally critical phase has been reached in all subsequent unre-
lated investigations. Id. at 238-39, 423 N.E.2d at 378-79, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 901-02
(Wachtler, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 231-32, 423 N.E.2d at 375, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
86. Id.
87. It is clear, however, that if the defendant did not have representation on the
prior charge, uncounseled interrogation concerning a subsequent charge would be
proper. In People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322, 420 N.E.2d 45, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247
(1981), the court held that a pending five-month old unrelated criminal case upon
which an arrest warrant had been issued did not bar the police from questioning a
suspect on a new matter when the suspect did not have counsel on the unrelated
charge. In what seems to be a withdrawal from the court's historically steadfast
refusal to dilute the fundamental right to an attorney, the majority overrides the
defendant's right to counsel so as not to "unrealistically limit police interrogation
procedures." Id. at 328, 420 N.E.2d at 48, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
88. People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894
(1981). People v. Miller, 54 N.Y.2d 616, 425 N.E.2d 505, 442 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1980),
decided along with Bartolomeo was also cited for this proposition. In Miller, the
court found that defendant's right to counsel had been violated by the admission at
trial of statements he had made during uncounseled interrogation. In August, 1977,
"Ms. McE." reported that she had been raped.The district attorney sought orders
directing defendant to appear for a corporeal lineup in connection with the investiga-
tion of the matter. For the purpose of opposing the orders, defendant was repre-
sented by an attorney. In August, 1978, "Ms. P." reported that she had been raped by
a man in a car, which police learned had been stolen. The victim provided police
with the license plate number and defendant was arrested, advised of his constitu-
tional rights and arraigned on the charge of criminal possession of stolen property.
During interrogation about the theft and the rapes, defendant'made incriminating
statements with respect to all three offenses.
The court affirmed the appellate division's order suppressing all three statements.
The court held that the statements relating to the stolen car were improperly ob-
tained based on the fact that the defendant had been arraigned on that charge, his
right to counsel had indelibly attached and he could not be interrogated concerning
that harge in counsel's absence. It was held further that the statements relating to
the 1977 rape were improperly obtained because the defendant was represented by
counsel in that matter, a fact of which the police were aware. Because counsel had
entered the proceeding, the defendant could not waive his right to counsel in the
absence of an attorney, and thus the uncounseled admission relating to the 1977 rape
was suppressed.
Regarding the statements relating to the 1978 rape, the court affirmed the lower
court's finding that the post-arraignment interrogation was an integrated whole in
which the impermissible questioning as to the criminal possession of the stolen vehicle
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the interrogation of a suspect who has a pending charge and is sus-
pected of having committed another crime. In Rogers, there was no
second charge under investigation and, therefore, no need to consider
the effect that prohibiting interrogation would have on the police
investigation of a second charge.8 9 By applying the prohibition in
Bartolomeo, where the defendant is actually under suspicion for two
unrelated crimes, representation on the first charge acts to insulate the
defendant from questioning about the second, thereby impeding the
police investigation of the subsequent criminal act. Continuing New
York's trend in liberalizing the pre-trial right to counsel, the court
was "so inter-related and intertwined" with and not fairly separable from the ques-
tioning on the 1978 rape that suppression of the latter was required.
The court also found another basis which rendered the questioning impermissible.
Citing Rogers for support, the court stated that since the defendant was known to be
represented by counsel in connection with the 1977 rape charge, questioning on other
matters was precluded.
The court used the Rogers prohibition against interrogation on unrelated matters
after an attorney has entered the proceeding as support for suppressing the defend-
ant's statement about the 1978 rape when they could have relied solely upon the per
se exclusionary rule. This rule, long accepted in New York, is based on the principle
that once a defendant is arraigned all questioning about matters related to the charge
must cease. Since the court accepted that the 1978 rape was interrelated with the
stolen property charge on which defendant was arraigned, any statements obtained
about the 1978 rape charge in absence of counsel were properly suppressed in
accordance with the post-arraignment rule. The application of the Rogers rationale
to the facts of the instant case represents a significant extension of the pre-trial right
to counsel.
Judge Wachtler concurred with the majority's result, but preferred to suppress the
statement about the 1978 rape on the rationale that because the right to counsel had
formally attached on the stolen property charge and because the courts below prop-
erly found the rape of "Ms. P." to be interrelated with that charge, no questioning
was permissible. Judge Wachtler was reluctant to extend the protection afforded by
representation on the first rape to bar questioning about the second rape which
occurred a year later. This reluctance is explained in his strongly worded dissent in
Bartolomeo. 53 N.Y.2d at 236, 423 N.E.2d at 377, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
89. The Rogers court did acknowledge the state's interest in investigating and
prosecuting criminal conduct but stated in a footnote that their
holding creates no undue impediment to the investigation of criminal
conduct unrelated to the pending charge. An accused represented by
counsel may still be questioned about such matters; we hold simply that
information obtained through that questioning in the absence of counsel
may not be used against him. Thus, the police may continue to obtain
information from a defendant who is a mere witness to unrelated events.
People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 173 n.2, 397 N.E.2d at 713 n.2, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22
n.2. The court did not consider the potential impediment to law enforcement that
this rule would impose if the defendant happens to be a suspect in another crime
unrelated to the pending charge. In Miller and Bartolomeo, the court did uphold the
prohibition against interrogation of a suspect about a crime in counsel's absence if the
suspect has had representation on another unrelated charge.
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further shifts the balance in favor of the defendant and places added
limitations on police efforts to control crime. 90
The Bartolomeo court, by holding that the attachment of the right
to counsel in one case precludes uncounseled interrogation about an
unrelated charge on which the right to counsel would not indepen-
dently attach, protects the recidivist from uncounseled interrogation
concerning a crime subsequently committed. The recidivist's right to
counsel is held to have attached in the case still pending and carry
over to the second unrelated charge; therefore, any waiver outside the
presence of an attorney is rendered ineffective. A one-time offender's
uncounseled waiver, however, would be given legal effect. Further-
more, a defendant need not assert his right to counsel nor inform the
officers of representation on the prior charge. Even if he denies that
he has a lawyer and is willing to talk, he is nonetheless insulated from
uncounseled interrogation.
The Bartolomeo decision favors the-recidivist because, as a practical
matter, it is the career criminal, not the first-time offender, who will
most likely have retained an attorney on a charge still pending which
provides him with virtual immunity from questioning about his latest
criminal acts."1 Historically, New York's right to counsel doctrine
was developed to protect a suspect from police abuses by guaranteeing
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and his constitu-
90. The Rogers court stated that their extension of the defendant's protection in
prohibiting uncounseled interrogation about unrelated matters represents no great
quantitative change in the protection they have extended in the past. 48 N.Y.2d 167,
173, 397 N.E.2d 709, 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 22.
However, extending the prohibition against uncounseled interrogation to second
offenders with pending charges does represent a quantitative change in an urban
setting where defendants are often rearrested during the pendancy of a prior charge.
Studies of defendants in New York City reflect high percentages of defendants
arrested with cases pending. According to a 1979 survey of cases in the New York
County Supreme Court and Criminal Court, the percent of defendants with open
cases pending at the time of arrest was 60 % in supreme court and 57 % in criminal
court. Report of the District Attorney, County of New York, Robert Morgenthau,
District Attorney, Table 1, page 10 (1979).
The court of appeals itself recognized the impracticality of providing criminal
defendants with counsel at every stage of investigation when they said, "Crimes,
arrests, and detentions of alleged wrongdoers often occur in the context of yiolence,
flight, pursuit, apprehension, and urgencies involving danger to life and limb ...
There is trenchant need for quick verification of identity, cause for arrest and
detention, and the desirability of early or even immediate release of those falsely
accused .. " People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 336, 320 N.E.2d 625, 629, 361
N.Y.S.2d 881, 888 (1974).
91. 53 N.Y.2d at 239, 423 N.E.2d at 379, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 902 (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting).
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tional right to the assistance of counsel. 92 Recognizing the imbalance
that occurs when an accused in custody is faced with the coercive
power of the state,93 the court of appeals held that the non-waivable
right to counsel attaches, as a matter of law, as a means of equalizing
the positions of the parties and of insuring that any waiver is made
voluntarily and intelligently.
The historic reasons which compelled the court to expand the New
York right to counsel doctrine do not compel the result reached in
Bartolomeo. Bartolomeo prevents a defendant from voluntarily con-
fessing to a crime in the absence of an attorney if he had representa-
tion on a prior charge. A confession given under such circumstances is
excluded even if there is no evidence of coercive influences. The
expansion of the non-waivable right to counsel rule by Bartolomeo is
unnecessary to protect the defendant from the coercive power of the
state. According to the principles expressed in prior case law, any
indication that a statement was not voluntarily given would be suffi-
cient to suppress the statement.9 4  Bartolomeo's flat prohibition
against uncounseled interrogation of the recidivist with prior repre-
sentation on an unrelated charge will prevent the prosecutor from
obtaining a conviction based on the defendant's voluntary confes-
sion.95
The Bartolomeo decision leaves several questions unanswered. The
court specifically refused to rule on what the consequences would be
in the case in which the defendant's prior arrest is remote in time or
place or is made by officers of another law enforcement agency.9" If
the court holds in future opinions that interrogation is precluded by
virtue of a prior arrest that is remote in time or place or has been
made by officers of another police department, then the arrest for
which the accused sought legal representation could insulate him from
uncounseled interrogation on all subsequent charges.9 7  The Bartolo-
92. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at 485, 348 N.E.2d at 898-99, 384 N.Y.S.2d at
422. See note 30 supra.
93. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
94, The reason for the requirement of counsel's presence at a waiver was to insure
that the person relinquishing his right to counsel was doing so voluntarily and not as
a result of coercive influences. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at 484, 348 N.E.2d at
898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
95. Under federal law, a voluntary confession is admissible. Recognizing that
confessions are a proper element in law enforcement, the Supreme Court stated
-[a]ny statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is,
of course, admissible in evidence." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478. See also
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
96. People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894
(1981).
97. Since the court has not denied that future holdings would go in this direction,
a strict liability approach must be considered a possibility.
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meo court did not take the opportunity to define "knowledge" on the
part of the police officer of a suspect's prior arrest. When faced with
this issue again in People v. Servidio9 8 and People v. Smith,9 the court
of appeals held that if the interrogating officer was not aware of the
defendant's pending charge on which he was represented by counsel,
knowledge of prior representation would not be imputed.100 How-
ever, if the interrogating officer knows that the defendant has been
arrested before, he is "under an obligation to inquire whether defend-
ant was represented by an attorney on the earlier charge."10' The
dissent in Smith argued that the Bartolomeo rule prohibiting the
police from questioning the defendant in the absence of counsel
should not be extended to situations where
mere knowledge of the existence of some prior charge can be said to
give rise to a series of possibilities or probabilities of various degrees
that the charge may still be outstanding, that the defendant was
represented by counsel in the past and that an attorney may still be
representing him. Under such an approach a repeat offender or
professional criminal will be immune indefinitely from police ques-
tioning because with creative hindsight it may be shown that there
was some possibility that one of his prior charges was still outstand-
ing. 102
The prohibition against uncounseled interrogation, as a matter of
law, during the investigatory stages of the law enforcement process
will impede police efforts to control crime in New York. In response to
Bartolomeo, procedural precautions have been implemented in the
form of a warning: the New York City Police Department now re-
98. 54 N.Y.2d 951, 429 N.E.2d 821, 445 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1981) (mem.).
99. 54 N.Y.2d 954, 429 N.E.2d 823, 445 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1981) (mem.).
100. The Servidio court reasoned that since the interrogating officer was not
aware of defendant's pending charge on which he was represented by counsel there
was no basis for inferring knowledge of the prior representation. People v. Servidio,
54 N.Y.2d at 953, 429 N.E.2d at 822, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
101. People v. Smith, 54 N.Y.2d at 956, 429 N.E.2d at 823, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 145,
quoting People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 232, 423 N.E.2d at 375, 440 N.Y.S.2d at
897.
102. Id. at 956, 429 N.E.2d at 824, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (Wachtler, J., dissent-
ing). A constructive notice approach which imputes the knowledge of a suspect's
prior arrest by a law enforcement agency to all its officers is impractical particularly
in large cities where individual police officers often do not have personal knowledge
of arrests made by fellow officers. The New York City Police Department, for
instance, employs over 20,000 officers and serves the five counties of New York City
which span over three hundred square miles. It is unlikely that an officer in one
county will have knowledge of an arrest made in another until he acquires the
suspect's arrest and conviction record. Letter from Thomas J. Flanagan, Director,
Legal Bureau, Police Department, New York, New York, to author (Aug. 5, 1981).
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quires an interrogating officer to ask a suspect if he is represented by
counsel on another charge if the officer knows that the suspect has
been previously arrested. 103 New York's urban centers are character-
ized by rising levels of crime, 0 4 reflected in large numbers of arrests
and a high rate of recidivism. 0 5 As a result, they will be adversely
affected by the impediment to law enforcement imposed by Bartolo-
meo.
IV. Conclusion
Since the criminal defendant's constitutional rights and the state's
responsibility to enforce the law exist in a balance, expansion of one
limits the other. In a series of decisions, the New York Court of
Appeals has continuously expanded the defendant's non-waivable
right to counsel. By extending this right to the investigatory stage of
the law enforcement process, the court has severely restricted the
ability of the police to interrogate a defendant. With this expansion of
the defendant's pre-trial right to counsel, the court has placed yet
another hurdle in the path of effective law enforcement.
Debra M. Zverins
103. -[W]here a New York City Police Officer makes an arrest, and he is aware of
a recent arrest by a police officer of another police agency in New York State, he
must ask the arrested person if he is represented by counsel before any waiver of the
right to counsel may take place." Legal Bureau Bulletin prepared by Office of the
Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters, New York City Police Department, Vol. 11,
No. 6 (July 30, 1981).
104. N.Y. Times, August 25, 1981, at B3, col. 1. Police statistics show that in the
first six months of 1981 serious crime in New York City rose 5.6% while robberies, a
violent crime that indicates the extent of predatory street crime, rose by 14.6%. Id.
105. Seventy-seven percent of 200 defendants studied in New York Supreme Court
proceedings have had prior arrests. On the average, the defendants had been arrested
eight times before. Report of the District Attorney, County of New York, Robert
Morgenthau, District Attorney, Table 1, page 10 (1979). Although no official anal-
yses have been made by the Probation Department, probation officers in New York
City estimate that as many as half the people who are now on probation are
eventually rearrested for new crimes. N.Y. Times, August 3, 1981, at Al, col. 3. See
generally Fishman, An Evaluation of Criminal Recidivism in Projects Providing
Rehabilitation and Diversion Services in New York City, 68 J. OF CRIM. LAW &
CRIMINOLOGY 283 (1977) (in a sample of 2,860 males who had arrest records for
serious crimes, more than 90% had at least one prior arrest). Id. at 289. See also
Roesch and Corrado, The Policy Implications of Evaluation Research: Some Issues
Raised by the Fishman Study of Rehabilitation and Diversion Services, 70 J. OF CRIM.
LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 530 (1979).
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